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The intergovernmental committee that negotiated the Convention on Biological 
Diversity (CBD) (United Nations Environment Program 1992) at the United 
Nations Environment Program (UNEP) generally lacked agricultural represen-
tation from most countries. Thus, the representatives and negotiators embarked 
upon their negotiations with considerable misinformation and a lack of under-
standing which created an atmosphere of conflict: South vs. North. An example 
is the Merck-INBIO Agreement in which Merck & Co., Inc., paid to INBIO in 
Costa Rica a flat sum of $ 1 million to help seek biodiversity which could 
be analyzed for bioactive compounds and, if successfully marketed, would 
bring royalties. There was a general lack of understanding that biodiversity 
prospecting for other uses might require or take different approaches, particu-
larly that for agricultural biodiversity where the genes of interest must also be 
very specific and must fit other criteria of the breeders. Breeding agricultural 
plants is a dynamic process, not extractive. The germplasm must provide 
specific trait(s), be able to be crossbred and be free from tightly linked 
undesirable traits.
At the same time as the negotiation of the Convention was underway, the 
Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) of the United Nations continued 
its effort to resolve the decade-old debate in its Commission on Plant Genetic 
Resources (CPGR): Who owns the world’s agricultural genetic resources? The 
CPGR was established in 1983 to implement the FAO’s International Under-
taking (IU) on Plant Genetic Resources, an FAO Resolution (8/83) (FAO 1983) 
to conserve and sustainably utilize agricultural genetic resources. The IU was 
triggered, to a large extent, by the expansion of breeders’ rights protection 
as more countries joined the treaty of the Union for the Protection of Newly 
Developed Varieties (UPOV). Social activist groups working with peasant 
farmers, such as the Rural Advancement Foundation International, challenged 
the equity when companies in developed countries obtained property protec-
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tion on cultivars of major food crops after inserting germplasm (particularly 
genes for disease and insect resistance) from farmer varieties (landraces). The 
companies made no provision for compensation to those farmer communities 
or countries from which the genes were obtained. (There has been no formal 
linkage in the international community between the exchanges and the 
utilization.) Some now call this proposed compensation, farmers’ rights.
The FAO’s IU attempted to make all germplasm, including that of private 
companies, freely available to all parties worldwide. Countries having strong 
private sector interests opposed this and did not sign onto the IU or did so with 
specific reservations to protect the private sector. Throughout a ten year period, 
generally nonconstructive debate ensued. The Keystone International Dialogue 
on Plant Genetic Resources, initiated in 1988, brought consensus in some areas 
relative to support for conservation in recognition of farmers’ rights, recogni-
tion of breeders’ rights, and the need for benefit-sharing with providers of 
germplasm (Keystone International Dialogue Series on Plant Genetic Resources 
1991). These consensus points became translated into agreed interpretations 
to the FAOs IU which were added to the original IU as attachments. Farmers’ 
rights are defined in the second addendum (1991) to the FAO IU, which does 
not advocate direct payment to farmers. The 1989 attachment clearly acknowl-
edges the need for a fund to preserve genetic resources, such as the FAO fund 
— a non-existent, voluntary but authorized fund — to support conservation 
and utilization to recognize farmer contributions over the many years.
The FAO Conference passed the voluntary but rather regulatory International 
Code of Conduct for Plant Germplasm Collecting and Transfer (FAO 1993). 
Besides stating some ethical principles for collectors and genebank managers, 
this Code suggests mechanisms for receiving benefits to the donors.
One item pressed to closure in October 1994 was the agreement by the 
International Agricultural Research Centers (IARC) to place their collections 
under the auspices of the FAO Commission. The issue of interest to all is 
the access to the large collections of the major food crops held at the IARCs. 
Developing country germplasm in the collections will still be available, but 
restrictions prevent any property protection placed on them directly by 
recipients. It does not deal with derivatives, and not everyone is satisfied with 
the agreement.
Current
The Commission on Plant Genetic Resources is negotiating a revised IU since 
some of its text is not in harmony with the Convention on Biological Diversity. 
A one-week extraordinary session of the normally biennial CPGR was held 
in November 1994, and country representatives expressed their expectations 
and positions on the integrated text of the IU and its annexes. Some countries 
were represented by some of the same negotiators as for the CBD, and the 
understanding of agricultural issues was little advanced. Additionally, many
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developing countries were represented only by the local permanent FAO 
representatives who have varying degrees of understanding of the issues at 
stake or of the related activities in their countries. The discussions went 
nowhere. The CPGR held a two-week session in late June 1995, and resumed 
negotiations on the 1U. The focus of the negotiating session was on the most 
difficult issues, thereby writing a prescription for potential failure. Property 
rights issues will remain very contentious as the issues will focus on access 
to genetic resources and farmers’ rights. All of this will be conducted in a 
political context — not scientific, not pragmatic, and not logical such as a 
concern for food security.
The success of these negotiations will likely impact heavily on future 
advances in crop breeding and production agriculture. Restricted access will 
affect developing and developed nations alike, depending on the crop. Since 
no nation’s agriculture is without interdependency of others, there will be many 
factors involved in what appears like a Chinese checkers match. For example, 
60 percent of the world’s food production is from crops and their relatives 
originally from Central and South America (maize, potato, sweet potato, 
cassava). But, rice from Asia is the world’s most important cereal, followed by 
wheat from Western Asia. It is hard to say how the African continent would 
fare since only 34 percent of its production is from crops native to Africa, 
primarily sorghum and millets. South America, at 94 percent dependency, is 
heavily dependent on the corn and beans from Central America and barley, 
oat, rice, wheat and soybean from different parts of Asia. Of course, the U.S. 
with its native sunflower — developed as a crop by the Russians — plants 
more than 99 percent of its crop acreage to non-native crops.
Access to genetic resources has been provided by formal exchanges between 
countries and less formal exchanges by institutes and scientists. Scientist 
exchanges have generally been with other scientists after visitation or meeting 
in scientific conferences. These exchanges are probably closest to the “mutually 
agreed terms” of the CBD since each has an expectation and there is reciprocity. 
The CBD is more oriented to bilateral arrangements which is the more normal 
way most exchanges are made. However, the rules of the game, until now, have 
been essentially multilateral, that is, there is a commonly accepted basis for 
exchange. If the CBD were to hold a strict accounting of exchanges, the lack 
of a multilateral arrangement would play hard on the countries that could 
least afford access to some needed genetic resources.
There is need for information and rational action on all fronts. The 
Conference of Parties to the Convention needs to understand the delicate 
balance between breeder access to genetic resources to thwart new pest 
breakouts and stable food supplies at a reasonable price. There are many 
questioning the global commodity exchange situation after the Uruguay 
Round of General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and its new 
successor World Trade Organization. Should all nations develop their own
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food production capacity? Some feel that with the increasing pressure on 
the environment, those countries best able to produce food under intensive 
agriculture should increase that sustainable capacity. Thus, import-dependent 
countries would remain so. However, no country feels comfortable being unable 
to control its food supply train. The U.S. exports approximately 60 percent of 
its wheat, 20 percent of its corn, and 35 percent of its soybean.
The U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) policy for the free flow of 
germplasm continues for the National Plant Germplasm System. During the 
period of 1990 through 1994, 182,678 samples were distributed to foreign 
requesters, about 92 percent to foreign public institutions, including the gene 
banks for repatriation. More than 41 percent of the germplasm was advanced 
germplasm and elite cultivars which went to public institutions for inclusion 
in their breeding programs. This is a significant contribution to development 
programs in other countries.
However, if de-registration of current pesticides were to occur without 
substitutes, U.S. crop losses would greatly reduce production and that left 
for export might not meet quality requirements of the importers. The impact 
would be considerable in international markets and the prices we all pay for 
grain and food. The impact on the U.S. for lack of access to genetic resources 
to provide genetic resistance to insects and diseases could thus be substantial. 
The ownership and exchange issue must be solved forthrightly.
The U.S. is greatly divided in its acceptance of the property rights on 
genetic resources. Institutions and breeders are divided, not necessarily 
along institutional lines. States are pressed financially to support crop 
development on crops not sufficiently lucrative to the private sector. Even 
fees from sales of those principal cultivars must support more than just those 
crops. However, most organizations feel that they could provide royalties when 
there has been an identifiable and substantial contribution from a plant to their 
new cultivar. If there is a benefit to the farmers, the farmers would justifiably 
pay for it in increased seed prices. However, depending on the market, they 
may not benefit when they sell the crop. With the increased yield obtained 
or protected by the gene(s), the cost per unit output will be fair or they will 
not pay it in the first place. In reality, they will pay since a protected crop is 
a value that farmers desire.
Thus, in the changing sense of equity, the public sector is moving to an 
understanding of the issues and accepts the need to pay for value received.
The private sector has generally been aggressive in contractually buying 
exclusive rights to germplasm of benefit and agreeing to pay for those benefits 
through royalty compensation. More importantly now, how will the process 
work? All organizations are more oriented to utilizing material transfer 
agreements (MTAs) to exchange germplasm in which the limitations to use 
are spelled out. Development of MTAs, which enable organizations such as 
the USDA to pass on germplasm and its associated obligatory requirements 
to others, may be a possible solution to the international germplasm impasse.
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However, tracking and monitoring the germplasm community for adherence 
to the ethical principles of acceptance and compliance with these principles 
will be important in maintaining such a global arrangement. This approach 
will have to be accepted by all for it to be effective. The biotechnology industry 
should foster legitimate exchange mechanisms and attempt to assure that future 
exchanges are transparent and fair.
The international community should consider some of the following points 
in establishing a protocol for germplasm exchange and benefits:
Provide open access to all genetic resources of food and agriculture;
Engage MTAs to enable research and breeding with the material;
Enable a brokerage system of recognized third parties to exchange the 
germplasm and provide annual balance sheets of exchanged 
germplasm;
Establish a tracking system and a compensation mechanism to support 
germplasm conservation activities, when appropriate; and 
Enable a bartering system where access is provided in exchange for 
training and/or technology.
If there is to be financial compensation where notable genes make contribu-
tions to new varieties or hybrids, a scale of declining royalty payments and a 
fixed time limit needs to be established for each contributing gene. The time 
limit on a particular variety may be fixed but the genes may be put into other 
derived varieties. The “profit” or market value of the cumulative sum of all 
new and old gene contributions could theoretically far exceed any expectations 
of profitability for any new variety. It must also be noted that value-added 
germplasm contributions also enter the equation, and that developing countries 
may now have to pay for that value when in the past, improved germplasm 
has been available at no cost. The proposed system will develop a bureaucracy 
and protectionism where there is no winner, particularly for the developing 
countries least able to afford it. When costs exceed benefits and the system 
is not working for the countries that need it, it will most likely be scrapped 
and bilateral conditions under mutually agreed terms will prevail.
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